INTRODUCTION
Business leaders are increasingly accountable for the stakeholders outside their immediate economic spheres, and their responsibilities extend to their companies' societal and environmental influences (Wade, 2006) . According to Carroll and Shabana (2010) , these new responsibilities are part of discretionary and ethical domains and represent the broader social contract between society and business. Although business leaders usually have certain degrees of discretion in their actions (Carroll, 1979; Crilly et al., 2008; Maak and Pless, 2006; Treviño et al., 2008; Waldman and Galvin, 2008) , their specific responsibilities are not always clearly defined and constantly prompt questions with regard to their legitimacy.
Any business leader's pursuit of responsible leadership includes considerable challenges, pressure, and complexities. In particular, the probable trade-offs between achieving profit maximization and undertaking societal or environmental responsibilities (Henriques and Richardson, 2012) illustrate the inherent difficulties of responsible leadership. An essential question these trade-offs imply has to do with whether responsible leadership can ever be truly responsible (Waldman and Siegel, 2008) . On this issue there is a gap in the literature; nurtured by various normative, descriptive, and paradigmatic points of view (Pless and Maak, 2011) , extant work is inconclusive in defining the extent and scope of responsible leadership. Waldman (2011) points out the caveats and dangers of these variations risking "confusion and even biases in the pursuit of an understanding of responsible leadership" (p. 77). We aim to address this gap by taking a business leader's point of view and analyzing the various drivers of responsible leadership. With a foundation of rational egoism theory (Peikoff, 1991; Rand, 1964; Smith, leadership follow strategic considerations along the lines of "good ethics is good business" (Schwartz and Carroll, 2003, p. 516) . For example, Porter and Kramer (2006) suggest that because business leaders are not responsible for all global problems, they should identify the issues their companies can resolve most effectively and from which they can earn the greatest competitive advantage. In addition, Waldman and Siegel's (2008) argument about what should drive business leaders in the area of CSR converges between the economic perspective and the stakeholder view. They conclude that a combination of instrumental, calculative behavior and business leaders' values and ethical motives is probably best for combining the two perspectives.
Converging views on responsible leadership therefore vary in both their degrees of stakeholder inclusion and their scopes of responsibility. They attempt to reconcile the economic and stakeholder views but do so in various ways.
Although agent, stakeholder, and converging views on responsible leadership display the characteristics and differences we have mentioned, they share two key commonalities. First, they assume that responsible leadership complies with legal regulations and law. Second, they assume that business leaders have discretionary choices in meeting their responsibilities (Carroll and Shabana, 2010) . These are relatively restricted, as the agent views maintain, or considerably expanded, according to the stakeholder perspectives. Because business leaders' discretionary choices within regulatory boundaries are so important, we next draw on literature about ethical decision making-on which we later build our analyses of the viability of responsible leadership from a business leader's perspective. Sonenshein (2007) classifies several influential studies as 'rationalist approaches', because the underlying theories assume that decision makers cautiously evaluate evidence and apply moral principles in response to ethical issues (e.g., Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1986) . Although Sonenshein finds these rationalist approaches popular and influentialpartly because of the absence of alternative explanations and theories-he points out their limitations. In particular, rationalist approaches tend to ignore uncertainty inherent in organizational settings and in people's intuitive choices and judgment. Woiceshyn (2011) asserts that several researchers find rational and intuitive components to contribute relatively equally to people's ethical decision making (Reynolds, 2006; Simon, 1987) . With a dual processing model, she argues that decision makers responding to ethical dilemmas spiral back and forth between rational and intuitive processing, but the underlying key process consists of integration by essentials. Based on interviews with CEOs, she finds that rational egoism is the moral code they apply when integrating conscious and subconscious processing and pursuing long-term success. The premise of rational egoism implies that maximizing one's own good and self-interest is the primary aim in life, because "Only selfpreservation can be an ultimate goal, which serves no end beyond itself." (Peikoff, 1991, p. 211) .
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DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS AND THE THEORY OF RATIONAL EGOISM
Although conflicting views exist (e.g., Bowie, 1991), rational egoism does not have a cynical intent, nor does it suggest that a person should realize whatever serves his or her self-interests.
Rather, the virtue of rationality implies the "acceptance of reasons as one's only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values and one's only guide to action" (Peikoff, 1991, p. 221 ).
Rational egoism is thus compatible with a common sense view of ethics as guide for living and thriving without harming others (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Woiceshyn, 2011) . Whereas rationality is the key virtue of rational egoism, several derivative virtues implicit in rationality RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 9 emerge from it: productiveness as creating value by adjustment of nature to humans; honesty as not faking facts in the pursuit of values; justice as assessing persons objectively and granting them what they deserve; independence as the main orientation to reality; integrity as being loyal to rational principles; and pride as achieving one's own moral perfection (Peikoff, 1991; Rand, 1964; Woiceshyn, 2011) .
The theory of rational egoism is compatible with the agent, stakeholder, and converging views on responsible leadership. Although these perspectives differ in their degrees of stakeholder inclusion and their scopes of responsibility, the theory's emphasis on rationality as the primary decision-making guidepost is appropriate for all three to explain the viability of responsible leadership from a business leader's point of view. In the common sense view of ethics, the theory is compatible with the 'do good' and 'do no harm ' (Crilly et al., 2008; Miska et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2013) dimensions of stakeholder engagement. It therefore provides an integrative framework applicable to the various views on responsible leadership. We thus discuss the foundations for applying the theory to responsible leadership.
INCENTIVES FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
The virtue of rationality involves recognizing and accepting reasons as the only foundation of knowledge and as the only guidance for judgments and actions (Peikoff, 1991) .
The different views on responsible leadership provide a variety of reasons for stakeholder engagement. Depending on the underlying perspective of responsible leadership and the implied degree of stakeholder inclusion and scopes of responsibility, business leaders may or may not consider these reasons relevant. We therefore label these reasons 'incentives', referring to their discretionary nature (Carroll and Shabana, 2010) . Based on our literature review, we suggest two broad categories of such incentives: (1) monetary and instrumental incentives and (2) nonmonetary and non-instrumental incentives. Both categories mirror the two views at the ends of the continuum we describe: agent views and stakeholder views. Although monetary and instrumental incentives for stakeholder engagement directly or indirectly contribute to a company's economic returns, non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives correspond to the ethical foundations of the stakeholder views and, in addition to economic goals, target societal and environmental responsibilities. Because a full list of incentives is beyond the scope of this article, we limit ourselves to discussing a handful of illustrations to demonstrate the viability of the two-type categorization.
Monetary and Instrumental Incentives
The incentives for stakeholder engagement to directly or indirectly increase or maintain a company's economic gains are distinctive in this category. Examples include strategic considerations, anticipated negative costs and sanctions in case of irresponsible leadership, and societal expectations.
Strategic considerations.
Several authors (e.g., Burke and Logsdon, 1996; Schaltegger and Wagner, 2006; Weber, 2008) identify the strategic benefits of CSR: Responsible leadership can benefit a company's reputation positively, help attract and retain talent more easily, or justify premium prices for products (Waldman and Siegel, 2008) . Although it is difficult for business leaders to assess the exact monetary value of their stakeholder engagement, this engagement might increase a company's economic gains and incentivize related behavior. In this regard, Barnett (2007) remarks that even if not all socially responsible activities maximize profits, some will. Porter and Kramer (2006) systematically guide business leaders to pursue strategies that leverage the benefits of responsible leadership to their companies' competitive advantage.
Anticipated negative costs and sanctions.
A plethora of evidence suggests that irresponsible leadership (i.e., business leaders who intentionally or unintentionally harm stakeholders) can result in negative effects for entire companies (e.g., Bansal and Candola, 2004; Detert et al., 2007) . The costs and consequences of such irresponsible leadership include alienated customers and suppliers, damaged corporate reputations, and a need for surveillance mechanisms (Cialdini et al., 2004; Waldman & Galvin, 2008) . Although such anticipated negative costs may not be tangible and are likely incalculable, the magnitude and consequences can be enormous. More generally, Devinney (2009) 
Non-Monetary and Non-Instrumental Incentives
Examples of this category represent incentives for stakeholder engagement that go beyond economic responsibilities and target societal and environmental goals. Such incentives have a strong ethical foundation and are directly linked to individual business leaders. Examples include business leaders' values and authenticity, sense of care and duty to help, and personal corporate citizenship.
Values and authenticity. Whetstone (2001) argues that business leaders might have several reasons for their actions, including personal values, such that "moral reasons can include … the belief that so acting is characteristic of the kind of person one wants to be" (p. 102).
Leadership scholars frequently link leaders' values to authenticity. Freeman and Auster (2011) propose that the concept of authenticity means acting on the basis of not only one's perceived values but equally "one's history, relationships with others, and aspirations" (p. 15). This We analyze the relevance of these incentive types for business leaders and how they make stakeholder engagement reasonable from a leader's perspective-that is, how incentives follow the principles of the theory of rational egoism. To this end, we propose a streamlined mathematical model and describe how the various incentives for stakeholder engagement affect business leaders' decisions. Table 1 about here
A FORMAL MODEL OF RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP
Mathematical models and economic-oriented analyses allow decision makers to incorporate logical considerations and rational deliberation. Although Hermalin (1998) observes that such approaches have not charted leadership research, scholars agree that formal analyses are useful at the firm level (e.g., Husted and de Jesus Salazar, 2006; Jones, 1995; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) . We believe that such a formal, rationality-based analysis at the individual level is equally useful for two reasons. First, it allows incorporating business leaders' deliberations and considerations in accordance with the theory of rational egoism. Second, it is capable of RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 14 reflecting how the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement interact. We first describe a basic model of responsible leadership, which we then extend by including the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement. We refine this model and incorporate considerations related to business leaders' time and planning horizons.
Basic Model of Responsible Leadership
To derive the business leader's objective function, we assume that it is possible to measure the extent to which a business leader considers stakeholder demands with a single variable S, which is presumed to be equal to or larger than zero, . In such a case, it appears -at least at first glance -unlikely that a business leader will realize stakeholder engagement, because doing so would lead to economic losses. 
Extended Model
Because of such potential divergences between profit maximization and societal and environmental stakeholder engagement, we need to extend our model and include the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement: monetary/instrumental and non-monetary/noninstrumental incentives. We assume monetary and instrumental incentives to be proportional to the company's profit function, . In contrast, non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives are independent of potential economic effects. Business leaders likely weight the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement differently-which responsible leadership theory reflects.
Thus, we assume that we can express the relative strength of non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives with a parameter α, grounded in the business leader's individual, person-related, and ethical considerations. In the simplest case, we may therefore model the business leader's overall objective function ( ) as follows:
If the business leader's decisions are affected only by monetary and instrumental considerations, then . Then, the business leader's sole aim is to maximize profits, u(S) =
. In contrast, a business leader who is also driven by non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives can be modeled by assuming that , such that not only the company's profits but also the company's stakeholder engagement are considered. A prominent example of the latter kind of leader is The Body Shop founder Anita Roddick, who decided to dump the principles of shareholder value and adopt a business model of social responsibility (Pless, 2007) . In her view, "The business of business should not be about money, it should be about responsibility. It should be about public good, not private greed." (Roddick, 2000, p. 3).
The business leader's objective function in Equation (1) allows us to derive a condition for the emergence of stakeholder engagement. When we calculate the first derivative of the business leader's objective function to identify its maximum, we find that a business leader opts for positive stakeholder engagement ( ) if .
In this equation, the term denotes the marginal change in profits if stakeholder engagement increases starting from zero, . When stakeholder engagement implies a trade-off with profits, and thus , the inequality in Equation (2) gives an upper bound for the profit loss that a business leader is willing to accept to demonstrate positive stakeholder engagement.
Based on this model, we derive four propositions: i) Purely profit-maximizing business leaders will care about a good relationship with the company's stakeholders only if stakeholder engagement is a means to increase profits.
If a business leader is driven purely by monetary and instrumental incentives-which the agent view of responsible leadership implies-the strength of non-monetary and noninstrumental incentives ( ) and, therefore the right-hand side of Equation (2), equals zero.
Thus, the condition in Equation (2) is fulfilled only if , implying that stakeholder engagement must positively correlate with the company's profits. Nestlé Group's chair and former CEO Peter Brabeck-Letmathe provides an example of such a profit-maximizing perspective. In an interview, he expressed concerns about altruistic giving: "I'm personally very much against corporate philanthropy. You shouldn't do good with money which doesn't belong to you." (Mulier and Bogner, 2010) .
ii) When business leaders are also driven by non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, they consider stakeholders' interests even if profits are at stake.
If a business leader is swayed by non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, which formally means that > 0, there might be positive stakeholder engagement even if the consequences for the company's profits are negative, . However, in this case the negative effects on the company's profits must not exceed the business leader's personal limit, because meeting the condition in Equation (2) is essential.
iii
) The higher the trade-off between stakeholder engagement driven by non-monetary and noninstrumental incentives and the company's economic performance, the more unlikely it will be for business leaders to opt for positive stakeholder engagement.
If positive stakeholder engagement leads to drastic economic losses (meaning that is strongly negative), then Equation (2) is more difficult to satisfy, and the business leader likely ignores stakeholders' interests.
iv) In contrast, business leaders motivated mostly by non-monetary and non-instrumental
incentives are willing to make substantial economic sacrifices to maximize their objective functions.
As Equation (2) shows, the more non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives sway a business leader (that is, the higher the leader's ), the more willing this business leader will be to accept potential negative economic consequences. This situation is particularly clear in the case of small companies whose owners, obeying social norms, accept considerably lower payments from their acquaintances. In extreme cases, such practices even may result in the bankruptcy of the company.
Refined Model
In the extended model, we relied on a simplification of the business leader's monetary and instrumental incentives, such that they were proportional to the present value of the company's profits. However, because the present value of the company's future profits is typically unknown, it is more realistic to suppose that the business leader's monetary and instrumental incentives are highly correlated with current profits, whereas future profits play a minor role for the business leader's objective function. We therefore refine the extended model and split the present value of the company's profits ( ) into two parts: denotes the current profit, and denotes the present value of the future profits. That is, we write the present value of profits as a sum of current profits and future profits: . Moreover, we introduce a parameter δ that indicates the business leader's planning horizon; a value of δ close to zero represents a business leader with a short planning horizon, whereas a value of δ close to one implies that a leader is interested in the long-term effect of his or her actions on profits. For both cases, we may modify the business leader's objective function in Equation 1 as follows:
.
According to this refined objective function, the business leader still aims to keep a balance between monetary and instrumental and between non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives. However, the leader's monetary and instrumental incentives might be linked more to current profits, a case which can be modeled by considering a leader with a short planning horizon, such that . In most applications, it seems plausible to assume that the immediate profit consequences of stakeholder engagement are negative, , whereas stakeholder engagement might hold positive returns in the future,:
. Under the modified objective function, the sufficient condition for the emergence of stakeholder engagement becomes:
. (4) Equation (4) A leader with a short-term planning horizon ( ) who is swayed only by monetary and instrumental incentives (i.e., the strength of non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives α is 0) will only consider the immediate profit consequences of stakeholder engagement, which are likely to be negative: . Thus, the condition in Equation (4) The longer the business leader's planning horizon δ, the more likely it becomes that future benefits of stakeholder engagement will compensate for immediate profit losses. More than a century ago, Werner von Siemens, the founder of Siemens which today has become a multinational electronics and engineering conglomerate, provided an exemplary statement reflecting this long-term consideration. He maintained that his company accomplish responsibilities to employees, society, and the environment: "I won't sell the future of my company for a short-term profit." (Siemens, 2013) .
vii) Business leaders who own the company they direct are more likely to demonstrate stakeholder engagement.
All other things being equal, business leaders who own the company they direct are more likely to take on a long-term perspective than are non-owning leaders. That is, such business leaders will have a longer planning horizon δ and naturally demonstrate stakeholder engagement. Furthermore, the reputation of a business leader who owns the company is often closely related to company reputation. Table 2 summarizes the results of these analyses. It displays stakeholder engagement as a function of the business leader's planning horizon and incentives. As the overview indicates, stakeholder engagement may be above or below the profit-maximizing level. In general, the longer the business leader's planning horizon, and the more non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives apply, the more stakeholder engagement business leaders demonstrate. It is important to note that though these conclusions derive from a mathematical model, using differential calculus, we do not presume that business leaders actively perform all these calculations. Instead, as evolutionary game theory suggests, learning and decision processes can result in rational behaviors even in the absence of calculative reasoning (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Table 2 about here
MODEL LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Although our analyses yielded several conclusions about conditions under which responsible leadership based on the two types of incentives for stakeholder engagement may be reasonable from a business leader's perspective, we offer some caveats. First, the theory of rational egoism provides a foundation to reconcile the various views of responsible leadership.
However, the assumptions implied by the virtue of rationality do not account for the cases of leadership action in which irrational or intuitive considerations are ultimately decisive. Despite empirical evidence that suggests that the virtue of rationality is applied by business leaders in their pursuit of success (Woiceshyn, 2011) , this idea opens up questions about situations and contexts in which business leaders are not guided by rationality principles or in which contextual influences may dominate business leaders' decision making. Further research on responsible leadership may find valuable opportunities to investigate these questions. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
We aim to contribute to extant research on responsible leadership by explaining stakeholder engagement characterized by 'do good' and 'do no harm' (e.g., Crilly et al., 2008; Miska et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2013) views. We intend to show that it is possible to reconcile these facets and that future theory development may benefit by going beyond the classical stakeholder-stockholder dichotomy. This observation might be important especially in view of current economic developments, globalization, and increased business interconnectedness. The phenomenon of responsible leadership is becoming increasingly complex and spans economies in various stages of development, different institutional environments, and diverse cultures. Arguably, the phenomenon as such is unlikely to reflect a clear understanding of its normative foundations, and rational egoism theory to some degree provides such a basis for our analyses. Yet given the growing complexity of the phenomenon and multiple contexts in which it is becoming relevant, approaches such as inductive normative methods (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) , as recently applied by Pless et al. (2012) , may be more constructive than singular imperative stances. A more lucid understanding of business leaders' views on responsible leadership and their underlying rationales could enrich research in the field. In this respect, our analyses represent a first approach to systematically mapping several of the various avenues that business leaders might follow.
The specific findings of our analyses provide several implications. We show that a positive relationship between stakeholder engagement and future profits is neither necessary nor From a policy perspective, our analyses have several implications: If endogenous incentives for business leaders to take all stakeholders into account are too low-such as when business leaders have short-term planning horizons-it may be in the public authority's (and the neglected stakeholders') interest to establish additional incentives. These exogenous stimuli could range from legal regulations (e.g., laws, prescriptions) to economic rewards (e.g., subsidies, grants) and might also include threats of sanctions (e.g., calls to boycott). Such regulations, though, could limit business leaders' room to maneuver and affect those with longer-term planning horizons, as the process of reconciling monetary and instrumental, as well as nonmonetary and non-instrumental, incentives gets restricted from the outside. Consequently, limiting business leaders' discretionary choices from the outside is likely to result in reduced opportunities for them to actively engage in 'do good' and 'do no harm' behaviors.
Because we have found that a positive effect of stakeholder engagement on a company's profits is neither necessary nor sufficient for business leaders' stakeholder engagement, the question arises about whether assessing managerial performance should still rely mostly on monetary measures. Several studies dispute this notion. For example, Székely and Knirsch (2005) suggest that measuring the extent to which corporate performance increases in response to implementation of CSR initiatives may be a way to strengthen linkages between financial and RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP 25 CSR performance, a link that turns out to be ambiguous but that receives empirical verification (e.g., Cochran and Wood, 1984; Godfrey et al., 2009; Schreck, 2011 's (2007) observation that "a business that constantly trades off the interests of one group for another is doomed for trouble and failure" (p. 10). Similarly, Kolstad (2007) argues that there are times when corporations should stray from profit maximization to pursue goals important to society and ultimately themselves. It is these varying instances that make responsible leadership an ambiguous concept that is difficult to grasp, and they also trigger the various conceptual views of the phenomenon. Our rationality-based approach represents one attempt to systematically delineate several of these instances to provide a lucid and nuanced perspective on the many facets of responsible leadership. 
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